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The myth of ‘evidence based policymaking’ in a decentred state 
Abstract. I describe a policy theory story in which a decentred state results from choice and 
necessity. Governments often choose not to centralise policymaking but they would not 
succeed if they tried. Many policy scholars take this story for granted, but it is often ignored in 
other academic disciplines and wider political debate. Instead, commentators call for more 
centralisation to deliver more accountable, ‘rational’, and ‘evidence based’ policymaking. Such 
contradictory arguments, about the feasibility and value of government centralisation, raise an 
ever-present dilemma for governments to accept or challenge decentring. They also accentuate 
a modern dilemma about how to seek ‘evidence-based policymaking’ in a decentred state. I 
identify three ideal-type ways in which governments can address both dilemmas consistently. 
I then identify their ad hoc use by UK and Scottish governments. Although each government 
has a reputation for more or less centralist approaches, both face similar dilemmas and address 
them in similar ways. Their choices reflect their need to appear to be in control while dealing 
with the fact that they are not. 
Introduction: policy theory and the decentred state 
I use policy theory to tell a story about the decentred state. Decentred policymaking may result 
from choice, when a political system contains a division of powers or a central government 
chooses to engage in cooperation with many other bodies rather than assert central control.  
However, it is largely borne of necessity: governments would fail if they tried to centralise 
policymaking. I base this argument on two abstract propositions: all policymakers face 
‘bounded rationality’ and engage in a policymaking environment over which they have limited 
knowledge and minimal control. The former suggests that they must ignore most information 
most of the time, since they can only pay attention to a tiny proportion of their responsibilities 
at any time (Baumgartner, 2017). The latter suggests that there are many policymakers and 
influencers spread across many types of government, producing a myriad of rules, networks, 
locally dominant beliefs, and ways to respond to socioeconomic conditions and events outside 
of the control of any single ‘centre’ (Heikkila and Cairney, 2018; Cairney and Weible, 2017). 
Some policymakers are more powerful than other actors, but not to the extent that we should 
conclude that there is singular central control. Rather, policymaking is multi-centric (Cairney 
et al, 2019).  
Variants of this story represent the conventional wisdom in key branches of US and European 
policy studies (Weible and Sabatier, 2018; Cairney, 2019). Its main messages are present in 
UK-focused comparisons between the simplified Westminster model story of central 
government power versus more realistic accounts of governance (Bache and Flinders, 2004; 
  
Kerr and Kettell, 2006; Rhodes, 1997). However, it does not have the same impact in wider 
political debate (Jordan and Cairney, 2013b: 235) or other academic disciplines (Oliver et al, 
2014a; 2014b). Its lack of impact in political debate often prompts central governments to try, 
in vain, to project an image of governing competence by regaining central control of 
policymaking (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003). Its lack of wider academic impact allows 
governments to tell stories of ‘evidence based policymaking' (EBPM) (Sullivan, 2011), and 
commentators to make misguided calls for more centralisation to deliver more ‘rational’ 
policymaking (Cairney, 2016).  
Indeed, the idea of EBPM sums up a large collection of longstanding myths, hopes, and 
political slogans about the use of information in central government (Cairney, 2016). For some 
governments, like New Labour (from 1997) in the UK, EBPM phraseology accompanied 
reforms to ‘modernise’ and take control of policymaking (Richards and Smith, 2004).  Further, 
‘what counts is what works’ symbolised the – sometimes sincere, sometimes strategic - 
assertion that evidence should trump ideology when addressing policy problems (Davies et al, 
1999). EBPM became a ‘useful myth’ to depoliticise issues (Boswell, 2018). For many critics 
of government, EBPM is an ideal to compare with actual practices, to identify ‘policy based 
evidence’, in which politicians make a choice then cherry-pick evidence to support it (Cairney, 
2019b). More generally, scientists bemoan the gap between the supply and use of evidence, 
often blaming it on ill-defined causes - such as low scientific literacy in government, low 
political will, or ‘post truth politics’ – without reference to the necessity of decentred 
policymaking or the contested nature of high quality or policy-relevant evidence (Oliver et al, 
2014a; 2014b; Jasanoff and Simmet, 2017; Cairney and Oliver, 2018).  
Such arguments raise an ever-present dilemma for governments, facing contradictory pressures 
to accept or challenge decentring, and accentuate a modern dilemma about how to describe 
ambitions for centralised EBPM in a decentred state. Governments could project a mix of noble 
intent and policymaking order, to use the language of EBPM to reinforce a story of a clearly 
defined single centre of government and central government control. Their story could be: a 
core group of policymakers and policy analysts can, and should, privilege high quality 
scientific evidence to identify problems and produce and evaluate solutions via a series of 
stages in a policy cycle (Cairney, 2016). If so, they need to resolve two problems: how to 
project central control in its absence; and how to make political choices, regarding what counts 
as policy-relevant evidence, while projecting the sense that such choices are technical or 
objective (Cairney, 2019d).  
To show how these dual dilemmas play out in practice, I first identify three ideal-type ways in 
which governments can address them consistently, to connect choices about how to (a) deal 
with decentred policymaking, and (b) gather and use evidence. There are several possible 
models of EBPM, from the centralist top-down rollout of uniform interventions that privilege 
a ‘hierarchy’ of scientific evidence, to the localist bottom-up spread of diverse programmes 
that privilege storytelling-based knowledge exchange between practitioners and service users. 
I then identify their – often ad hoc and inconsistent - use by UK and Scottish central 
governments. Each government has a reputation for top down (UK) and bottom up (Scottish) 
‘policy styles’ (Cairney, 2019c), but both face similar pressures to let go and hold on to control 
  
(Matthews, 2016). Their choices reflect their need to appear to be in control while dealing with 
the fact that they are not. Pragmatism may prompt them to acknowledge their limits somewhat, 
but Westminster-style democratic accountability reminds them to portray an image of central 
control, in which you know who is responsible and to blame in elections. Although the Scottish 
and UK governments project a preference for different models, in practice they adopt similar 
mix-and-match approach to governance and evidence choices.  
The policy theory story of decentring: bounded rationality and complex 
policymaking environments preclude EBPM 
This special issue contains several ways to engage with ‘decentring’, prompting some need for 
disambiguation. Bevir (2013: 1; 152-3) provides a useful distinction between:  
1. His preferred (a) description of governance as ‘as a set of diverse practices that people 
are constantly creating and recreating’ rather than real and fixed formal laws and 
institutions, and (b) emphasis on theoretical analysis that shows why we should not 
assume that a powerful central government would exist. 
2. Accounts that are too keen to ‘reify’ such practices, to (a) describe a real and identifiable 
source of central authority (such as ‘the centre’, ‘central government’, or ‘core 
executive’), and (b) present empirical analysis in which the loss or gain of central 
government power is measurable.  
My story largely takes the former approach to use (a) theoretical reasons to expect ever-present 
decentred policymaking, to inform (b) old and new concepts that describe too-high 
expectations for central government control over policy processes and outcomes. I use some of 
the language of central control to engage with an audience familiar with those terms, rather 
than suggest that there is a well-defined actor that we can simply call ‘central government’. A 
policy theory story, that policymakers have to ignore almost all evidence and decisions taken 
in their name, and do not understand far less control the policy process, provides a lens through 
which to analyse claims to the contrary.   
EBPM and comprehensive rationality as an ideal-type or ideal state 
However, it is not straightforward to analyse new discussions of EBPM, because many seem 
to conflate two propositions that should be separated analytically: an ideal state to which we 
should aspire (an empirical proposition), and an ideal-type to compare with what is possible in 
the real world (a theoretical proposition). Many scientists and policymakers articulate the idea 
that policymakers and researchers should cooperate to use the best evidence to determine ‘what 
works’ in policy. At times, this language is reminiscent of 1950s discussions of the ideal-type 
‘comprehensive’ rationality in policymaking (Cairney, 2019d). At other times, EBPM appears 
to be an ideal state to compare with the more disappointing ‘policy based evidence’ processes 
they find when they engage in politics (Cairney and Oliver, 2017).  
Still, these modern discussions re-establish the value of classic theoretical discussions of the 
ideal-type, which involves a core group of elected policymakers at the ‘centre’ (or ‘top’), using 
their values to identify problems to solve, and translating their policies into action to maximise 
benefits to society, aided by neutral organisations gathering all the facts necessary to produce 
  
solutions (John, 1998: 33). In practice, central actors are unable to: separate values from facts 
in a meaningful way; rank policy aims in a logical and consistent manner; gather information 
comprehensively, or possess the cognitive ability to process it (Simon, 1976; Lindblom, 1959; 
Cairney, 2012a: 96-7). Instead, Simon (1976: xxviii) described policymakers addressing 
‘bounded rationality’ by using ‘rules of thumb’ to limit their analysis and produce ‘good 
enough’ decisions. Further, Baumgartner and Jones (1993; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005) show 
that policymakers can only pay attention to a tiny proportion of their responsibilities, which 
always limits their potential control of the many decisions made in their name.   
In that context, modern references to a comprehensively evidence-driven policy process are 
misleading if they describe the sense that we are getting closer to an ideal-type. As Botterill 
and Hindmoor (2012: 367) describe, advances in scientific research methods and information 
technology have given ‘a new breath of life’ to hopes for comprehensive rationality, but the 
accumulation of new evidence does not diminish the problem of bounded rationality (Cairney, 
2016: 14a).  Instead, modern discussions of policymaker psychology focus on the ‘rational’ 
short cuts that policymakers use to identify good enough sources of information, combined 
with the ‘irrational’ ways in which they use their beliefs, emotions, habits, and familiarity with 
issues to identify policy problems and solutions (Kahneman, 2012; Haidt, 2001; Lewis, 2013; 
Cairney and Kwiatkowski, 2017; Lodge and Wegrich, 2016).  
This scarcity of attention helps explain, for example, why policymakers ignore most issues in 
the absence of a major event (Shaffer, 2017), policymaking organisations make searches for 
information which miss key elements routinely (Workman et al, 2017), and organisations fail 
to respond to changing circumstances proportionately (Epp, 2017). Actors engage in ‘trial-and-
error strategies’, use their ‘social tribal instincts’ to rely on ‘different decision heuristics to deal 
with uncertain and dynamic environments’, tell stories to persuade their audience to see a 
policy problem and its solution in a particular way, or make emotional judgements based on 
stereotypes to propose benefits to some populations and punishments for others (Cairney, 
2013a: 279; Lubell, 2013: 544; Jones et al, 2014; Schneider and Ingram, 1997). In each case, 
‘most members of the system are not paying attention to most issues most of the time’ 
(Baumgartner, 2017: 72). Bounded rationality precludes the possibility of a small group of 
people at the centre with the ability to gather all evidence and coordinate policymaking (and 
studies such as Maybin, 2016 describe this limitation in action).  
Policymakers do not control the policy process  
Advocates of EBPM often seem drawn to the idea of a linear and orderly policy cycle with 
discrete stages – agenda setting, policy formulation, legitimation, implementation, evaluation, 
policy maintenance/ succession/ termination – because it offers a simple and appealing model 
with clear advice on how to engage (Oliver et al, 2014b). Indeed, the stages approach offers an 
idea of how policy should be made: elected policymakers in central government, aided by 
expert policy analysts, make and legitimise choices; skilful public servants carry them out; and, 
analysts assess the results with the aid of scientific evidence (Jann and Wegrich, 2007: 44; 
Colebatch, 1998: 102). It exists as a story for policymakers to tell about their work, partly 
because it is consistent with the idea of elected policymakers being in charge and accountable 
(Everett, 2003: 66–8; Cairney, 2015: 25-6; Rhodes, 2013: 486). 
  
Some scholars question its normative appropriateness, since it does not allow for the diffusion 
of power in multi-level systems or ‘localism’ to tailor policy to local needs and desires (Barrett 
and Fudge, 1981; Hill and Hupe, 2009; Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Cairney et al, 2019). Further, 
the cycle provides misleading practical advice: you will generally not find an orderly process 
with a clearly defined debate on problem definition, a single moment of authoritative choice, 
and a clear chance to use scientific evidence to evaluate policy before deciding whether to 
continue (Sabatier and Weible, 2014; Cairney, 2012a; 2018). In the place of cycles, policy 
theories conceptualise the relationship between five main factors that constitute the 
policymaking environment (John, 2003: 488; 1998: 173; Heikkila and Cairney, 2018; Cairney, 
2016: 27-30): 
1. Many actors making and influencing choices at many levels of government. Scientists 
are competing with many actors to present evidence and secure a policymaker audience, 
and there are many ‘venues’ in which authoritative decisions can take place. 
2. A proliferation of ‘institutions’, or the rules and norms maintained in many ‘venues’. 
Rules can be formal and well understood, or (more in keeping with Bevir’s analysis) 
‘exist in the minds of the participants and sometimes are shared as implicit knowledge 
rather than in an explicit and written form’ (Ostrom, 2007: 23). They include rules of 
evidence gathering; support for ‘evidence based’ solutions varies markedly according 
to which organisation takes the lead, how its actors understand problems, and the 
practices they encourage. 
3. The pervasiveness of policy networks, or relationships between policymakers and 
influencers, many of which develop in ‘subsystems’ and contain small groups of 
specialists. Some networks are close-knit and difficult to access because bureaucracies 
have operating procedures that favour particular sources of evidence and participants. 
Exclusivity can help scientific advocates, as privileged insiders in some venues, and 
hinder them, as outsiders in others (Cairney et al. 2012: 43; Boswell 2009: 16). 
4. A tendency for entrenched ‘ideas’ – the ‘core beliefs’ of policymakers or ‘paradigms’ 
in which they operate - to dominate discussion (Hall, 1993). Beliefs influence levels of 
receptivity to new policy solutions (Kingdon, 1984). New evidence on the effectiveness 
of a solution must be accompanied by persuasion to prompt a shift of attention to a 
problem and a willingness to understand it in a new way. 
5. Policy conditions and events that can reinforce stability or prompt policymaker 
attention to shift. Social or economic ‘crises’ or ‘focusing events’  prompt lurches of 
attention from one issue to another, and evidence can be used to encourage that shift, 
but this outcome is not inevitable (Birkland, 1997). 
On that basis, many theories present variations on the theme of limited central control. For 
example, the study of ‘policy communities’ begins with the identification of a state, so large 
and crowded, that it is in danger of becoming unmanageable. Consequently, the state’s 
component parts are broken down into sectors and sub-sectors, with power spread across 
government. Elected policymakers can only pay attention to a tiny proportion of issues for 
which they are responsible. They pay attention to a small number and ignore the rest. They 
  
delegate responsibility to other actors such as bureaucrats, often at low levels of government. 
Bureaucrats rely on specialist organisations for information and advice. Organisations trade 
such resources for access to, and influence within, government. Therefore, most public policy 
is conducted through small and specialist communities at a level of government not particularly 
visible to the public, and with minimal senior policymaker involvement (Richardson and 
Jordan, 1979, Jordan and Maloney, 1997; Jordan and Cairney, 2013). 
Similarly, punctuated equilibrium theory suggests that policymakers at the ‘macro’ level can 
only pay attention to a tiny proportion of all possible issues, and that attention lurches from 
issue to issue. This dynamic produces ‘hyperincremental’ change in most fields and profound 
change in a small number (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). Multi-level governance (MLG) and 
polycentric governance suggest that there is no single source of authority in political systems. 
Central governments cooperate with other actors to produce the rules to which many 
policymaking organisations might agree (Bache and Flinders, 2004; Rhodes, 1997; Aligica and 
Tarko, 2012; Heikkila and Andersson, 2018).  
Studies of policy succession, inheritance, and historical institutionalism suggest that most 
‘new’ policies are revisions of old policy (Hogwood and Peters, 1983), new governments begin 
by accepting the commitments of their predecessors (Rose, 1990), and choices in the past 
contributed to the formation of the rules of organisations operating in the present (Pierson, 
2000). Studies of implementation suggest that policy is delivered at the ‘bottom’ by actors 
subject to too many rules to follow; they use their discretion, judgement, and training to fulfil 
a proportion of central government aims (Lipsky, 1980). Complexity theorists identify a 
tendency for policy to ‘emerge’ from complex policymaking systems, often at a local level and 
despite attempts by central governments to control outcomes (Teisman and Klijn, 2008: 288; 
Cairney, 2012b: 349; Sanderson, 2006; 2009; Geyer and Cairney, 2015). 
In relatively few cases, policy theories provide a greater sense of central government or 
policymaker control. Social construction and policy design (SCPD) suggests that policymakers 
make quick moral choices based on social stereotypes, and these choices have a profound effect 
on policy design (Schneider and Ingram, 1997; Schneider et al, 2014). In other approaches, 
there is more emphasis on strategic control of policymaking, including ‘blame game’, 
‘statecraft’, and ‘depoliticisation’ strategies used by central governments to appear 
authoritative, or ‘metagovernance’ strategies to control policy networks (Cairney et al, 2019: 
25-6; Hood, 2010; Jessop, 2003; Sorensen and Torfing, 2005; Dommett and Flinders, 2015).  
However, a story of multi-centric policymaking seems to represent the conventional wisdom 
in policy studies (Cairney et al, 2019). There are many variants of this story, and it is often told 
with more subtlety than in this article, but each variant suggests that highly centralised 
government is unlikely because boundedly rational policymakers must ignore most evidence 
and most decisions taken in their name, and only partially understand the policymaking 
environment in which they operate (Jones and Thomas, 2017).  
Further, this story accentuates a large literature referring to ‘evidence informed’ rather than 
‘based’ policy. For many scholars, ‘informed’ symbolises a way to manage expectations for 
EBPM (Boaz et al, 2019; Head, 2008). Indeed, some practitioners describe a discursive shift 
  
from ‘based’ to ‘informed’ to highlight their experience of a ‘messy’ policy process in which 
the connection between evidence and policy is unclear (Topp et al, 2018; Gluckman, 2016). In 
comparison, my story is designed to prompt some readers to wonder why they thought that 
EBPM driven by ‘the centre’ could ever be a realistic proposition. 
The Westminster Model’s story of central government control 
Stories of decentred policymaking are pervasive in policy studies, but not Westminster politics. 
They compete badly with variants of the Westminster model’s story (Richards and Smith, 
2002: 3; Marsh et al, 2001; Rhodes, 1997; Bevir and Rhodes, 1999; Gains and Stoker, 2009). 
At its heart is a simple normative message about democratic accountability, based on concepts 
such as: 
• Representative democracy, in which most public participation is via elections rather 
than direct engagement, and most government accountability is to the public through 
elections and parliamentary scrutiny. 
• Parliamentary sovereignty, unitary state, and a fusion of executive and legislature, in 
which power is retained in UK central government (then shared somewhat with EU and 
devolved governments). 
• Majority party control, in which a plurality electoral system exaggerates a party’s 
majority to command a majority in Parliament.  
• Cabinet government and individual ministerial responsibility, in which the Prime 
Minister appoints the Cabinet, and Secretaries of State are responsible for all that 
happens in their departments.  
There are many ways to tell this story, but the moral remains the same: power and responsibility 
go hand in hand since, if you know who is in charge, you know who to reward or punish. It 
remains important even if fictional (Duggett, 2009). Its rhetorical power endures when people 
maintain a simple argument during general election and referendum debates: we know who 
should be in charge and should hold people to account on that basis. This perspective has a 
profound effect on the ways in which policymakers defend their actions, and political actors 
compete for votes or policy outcomes, even when it is ridiculously misleading and ministers 
know it (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006; Bevir, 2013; Rhodes, 2013; Cairney, 2019a). Consequently, 
policymakers respond to two contradictory stories, stressing: 
1. Their need to let go, and share power with many actors, to reflect their limited control.  
2. Their need to hold on, to live up to an electoral imperative, and respond to parliamentary 
scrutiny by telling a story of their success. Or, some might believe that they could 
control government if they tried (Hay, 2009; Matthews, 2016). 
To do so, they play a game of shared and sole responsibility.  Ministers try to construct an 
image of governing competence by making ‘hard choices’ and dominating the legislative 
process without necessarily expecting long term results (McConnell, 2010). Or, when 
frustrated with their lack of progress, they seek to reform government to reassert power by: 
forming quangos to bypass the role of local authorities (Greenwood et al, 2001: 157; Stoker, 
  
2004: 32); transferring industries to the market; obliging local authorities to ‘contract out’ the 
delivery of public services to other bodies; and, constructing regulatory and performance 
management regimes designed to control public bodies from the centre (Hood, 2007).  
In that context, a common argument is that the UK Government has exacerbated its 
‘governance problem’ (the gap between an appearance of central control and what central 
governments can actually do) while trying to solve it (Cairney, 2009). ‘New public 
management’ reforms, perhaps designed to reassert central government power, often reinforced 
a fragmented public landscape. This outcome prompted academic debate about the extent to 
which the UK state was: (a) ‘hollowing out’ and increasingly unable to influence policy 
outcomes without the aid of a range of other bodies, or (b) ‘rejuvenated’ and ‘lean’, with 
ministers able to focus on core tasks, make strategic decisions, and create rules to ensure that 
their aims are carried out by others (Rhodes, 1994; 1997; Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 6; Cairney, 
2012a: 160; Hogwood, 1997; Holliday, 2000; Marinetto; 2003; Marsh, Richards and Smith, 
2003: 308; Richards and Smith, 2006: 182). 
We should understand EBPM in that context: policymakers are unable to hoard power at the 
centre, but struggle to find a defendable way to let go. They have gone to incredible lengths to 
juggle their need to appear to be in control, to defend their record in elections and to Parliament, 
with their need to pragmatic and share policymaking responsibility to get things done (or to 
pass on responsibility for outcomes to others). This juggling act reflects the difficulty of 
reconciling forms of accountability based on the centralization versus diffusion of power. 
Governments rely on quasi-non-governmental, private, and third sector bodies for the success 
of policy delivery and periodically seek to reform the public sector to re-inject clarity of 
responsibility (Richards and Smith, 2004; Flinders and Skelcher, 2012). Ministers devolve 
decisions to public bodies but also intervene, in an ad hoc way, to deal with organisational 
crises (Gains and Stoker, 2009: 11). Therefore, we should we should be wary of governments 
when they use EBPM phraseology to suggest that they can coordinate the use of evidence from 
the centre in a straightforward and predictable manner.   
The Scottish approach to EBPM: territorial responses to universal pressures 
The election of new parliaments in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in 1999 marked a 
new era of devolved government in which a series of constitutional choices fostered deliberate 
decentring (Birrell, 2012). However, it also prompted each devolved central government to 
deal with their own versions of these practical limits to central control. For example, compare 
the ways in which UK and Scottish governments have addressed issues of decentring, given 
three main ways in which their contexts differ:  
1. Electoral dynamics. The Scottish Parliament is elected using a mixed-member 
proportional system, producing more need for coalition or minority government, 
potentially contributing to a general spirit of ‘inclusiveness, bargaining and 
compromise’ (Lijphart, 1999: 2). However, it also operates largely as a mini-
Westminster, in which the government governs and Parliament scrutinises (Cairney and 
McGarvey, 2013). 
2. Responsibilities. The Scottish Government’s responsibilities do not include areas, such 
  
as economic policy, most associated with ideological contestation (Cairney, 2015). It 
largely took control of social policy functions including health, education, social work, 
criminal justice, housing, and local government, while the UK retained control of areas 
including international affairs, economic policy, and social security. Scotland enjoyed 
further periods of devolution after 1999, including key aspects of taxation and social 
security in 2016.  
3. Policymaking scale. Scotland’s population of five million is relatively small, and the 
Scottish Government’s capacity is limited.  The scale of policymaking produces the 
potential for relatively close personal relationships to develop between senior 
policymakers in central government and leaders of public bodies and key stakeholders.  
It also prompts civil servants to rely more on external experts and the organisations 
with experience of policy implementation.  
In that context, the Scottish Government developed a reputation for making policy in a different 
way than the UK Government, partly to deal with decentred policymaking in a ‘bottom up’ 
way. A ‘Scottish policy style’ describes: 
1. The Scottish Government’s reputation for making policy through networks, pursuing a 
consultative and cooperative style with ‘pressure participants’ (Jordan et al, 2004; 
Keating, 2005; 2010; Cairney, 2009; 2011b; 2013b; Cairney and McGarvey, 2013).  
2. A distinctive ‘governance’ style: a relative willingness to devolve the delivery of policy 
to public bodies (Cairney, 2009).  
Scotland’s reputation owes much to the views of pressure participants, who describe the UK 
policy process as less consultative, more top-down, less reliant on professional or policy 
networks, and with more willingness to generate competition between participants, and senior 
Scottish Government ministers and civil servants, who have accentuated this image (Cairney, 
2011a: 130; Cairney and McGarvey, 2013: 142; Cairney, 2014: 9). Most participants identify 
hopes for a new culture of policymaking, rather than systematic evidence (Cairney, 2008: 358; 
2019c; Cairney and McGarvey, 2013: 13). Most notably, former Permanent Secretaries of the 
Scottish Government describe how it developed several models of policymaking to:  
• join up government by abolishing policy-specific departments 
• develop long term outcome-based measures of success, not short term targets driven 
from the centre 
• form a concordat with the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) to reduce 
central ‘micromanagement’ 
• use the ‘improvement method’ to combine evidence and governance, with a strong 
emphasis on practitioner experience, the ‘assets’ of local communities, and the co-
production of public services with service users (Elvidge, 2011; Housden, 2014).  
Further, Housden (2014: 69-70) argues that this approach contrasts with most periods of UK 
policymaking, marked by centrally driven targets and a performance management regime 
  
associated with New Public Management.  
Yet, there are three important qualifications. First, Housden’s (2014: 71-2) justification of the 
Scottish Approach, in relation to the limits to central government control and the non-linear 
nature of policymaking systems, bears a strong resemblance to my story regarding all political 
systems. Second, in practice, the Scottish Government plays ‘the game of democratic 
accountability’ which requires it to present an image of central government competence 
(Cairney, 2016: 289-90). Third, key local government actors describe the central-local 
relationship as centralist (Cairney, 2011a: 130; O’Neill, 2014). 
The UK and Scottish governments face a continuous trade-off between central and local 
control, and the unintended consequences of the balance they attempt to strike. When they 
pursue centralism, they encounter limits to joined-up government at the centre, and emergent 
outcomes beyond their control at local levels. When they encourage local discretion, and the 
involvement of users and communities in service delivery, they encounter problems of 
accountability when there does not seem to be a meaningful nationally-driven strategy and 
there is high potential to identify a ‘postcode lottery’ in which people receive a different level 
of service according to where they live (Cairney et al, 2016: 2). These discussions suggest that 
the UK’s top-down image is often exaggerated by a focus on electorally salient issues and 
adversarial party competition, while Scotland’s bottom-up image is exaggerated by misleading 
comparisons with the UK. If we focus on the bigger picture, we find similar practices that occur 
when governments seek ways to emphasise central government authority while adapting to 
their limits. 
Three consistent EBPM models and their inconsistent use 
When scientists promote the use of the best evidence to determine ‘what works’ in policy, they 
often side-step the fact that evidence quality is highly contested (Oliver and Cairney, 2019; 
Parkhurst, 2017). For some researchers, there is a hierarchy of evidence: at the top is the 
randomised control trial (RCT) and the systematic review of RCTs, with expertise much further 
down, followed by practitioner experience and service user feedback near the bottom (Oliver 
et al, 2014a; 2014b; Oliver and Pearce, 2017). For others, this hierarchy should be flipped on 
its head to accentuate the role of experience and judgement to make choices based on many 
claims to knowledge (see Boaz et al, 2019; Nutley et al, 2013; Fleming and Rhodes, 2018; 
Cairney, 2019b). Most policymakers prefer a wider range of sources of information, combining 
their own experience with information ranging from peer reviewed scientific evidence and the 
‘grey’ literature, to public opinion and feedback from consultation (Cairney and Oliver, 2017; 
Lomas and Brown, 2009; Nilsson et al, 2008; Davidson, 2017). Further, while it may be 
possible to persuade some central government departments or agencies to privilege specific 
forms of scientific evidence, they also pursue other principles, such as to foster consensus-
driven policymaking or a shift from centralist to localist practices (Cairney, 2016). The choice 
of good evidence is political, and linked inextricably to other choices about good policymaking. 
Consequently, EBPM involves the combination of two simultaneous political choices, to 
resolve (a) contradictory – decentring and centralising - pressures in governance and (b) 
debates on how to identify what evidence counts. Table 1 identifies three ideal-type models to 
  
describe the ways in which governments could make consistent choices when selecting sources 
of evidence and deciding how to centralise or localise policymaking when they seek to spread 
policy interventions across a whole country: 
Table 1: three consistent approaches to ‘scaling up’ evidence-informed policy  




Model 3  
Improvement method 
The main story Interventions are highly 
regarded when backed by 
empirical data from 
international randomised 
control trials (RCTs). The 
approach has relatively 
high status in health 
departments, often while 
addressing issues of 
health, social care, and 
social work.  
Practitioners tell 
stories of policy 
experiences, and 
invite other people to 
learn from them. 
Policy is driven by 
governance 
principles based on 
co-producing policy 
with service users. 
Central governments 
identify promising 
evidence, train practitioners 
to use the improvement 
method, and experiment 
with local interventions. 
Discussion about how to 
‘scale up’ policy combines 
personal reflection and 
empirical evidence of 
success. 
How should you 
gather evidence 
of effectiveness 
and best practice? 
With reference to a 
hierarchy of evidence and 
evidence gathering, 
generally with systematic 
reviews and RCTs at the 
top.  
With reference to 








interventions, based on a 
mix of evidence. Encourage 
trained practitioners to 
adapt interventions to their 
area, and gather comparable 
data on their experience. 
How should you 
‘scale up’ from 
evidence of best 
practice? 
Introduce the same model 
in each area.  
Require fidelity, to 
administer the correct 
dosage, and allow you to 
measure its effectiveness 
using RCTs. 
Tell stories based on 
your experience, and 
invite other people to 
learn from them. 
A simple message to 
practitioners: if your 
practice is working, keep 
doing it; if it is working 
better elsewhere, consider 
learning from their 
experience. 
What aim should 
you prioritise? 
To ensure the correct 
administration of the 
same active ingredient. 
To foster key 
principles, such as 
localism and respect 
for service user 
experiences.  
To train then allow local 
practitioners to experiment 
and decide how best to turn 
evidence into practice.  
Source: adapted from Cairney (2017) and Cairney and Oliver (2017). Note that definitions of ‘implementation 
science’ and ‘improvement method’ are contested. The ideal-types could simply be called models 1-3. 
For example, the choice to (try to) centralise policymaking is consistent with the choice to roll 
out uniform policy interventions driven by evidence from RCTs (Cairney and Oliver, 2017). 
Or, the choice to delegate policy routinely to local communities, service users, and practitioners 
is consistent with the choice to value experiential knowledge shared personally via storytelling. 
Within these two extremes are many ways to combine evidence and governance, including 
compromise models to combine pragmatic forms of decentred governance with centrally-
  
provided training. For example, the improvement method – advertised most highly in Scotland, 
but also encouraged by parts of the UK government - developed partly with reference to the 
limitations of a uniform approach built primarily on RCT evidence (Cairney and Oliver, 2017).  
In a small number of cases, we can find empirical examples of projects that come close to each 
of the three models (see Cairney, 2017). The Family Nurse Partnership gained its reputation 
from US-based RCTs and wider international experience, before the UK and Scottish 
governments cooperated to roll out a uniform model (Model 1). My Home Life, introduced in 
England and then Scotland, combines governance principles (such as respectful conversations 
with service users) and storytelling to share evidence of good practice in care home settings 
(Model 2). The Early Years Collaborative (in Scotland) is an ambitious project to adapt the 
improvement method (used primarily in healthcare) to cross-cutting policy aims (Model 3).  
However, more generally, policymakers do not make these choices consistently. Rather, we 
can see a large collection of ad hoc decisions to exercise power and use evidence in patchy 
ways. For example, UK and Scottish governments have used the phrase ‘let a thousand flowers 
bloom’ to symbolise a desire to entertain many models of policymaking, and to pursue an often 
contradictory commitment to local discretion when pursuing evidential approaches that seem 
to inhibit localism. The Scottish Government advertises improvement methods but entertains 
a mix of all three (Cairney, 2017). The UK Government style is harder to piece together, but 
key experiences like early years intervention are instructive (Cairney and St Denny, 2020). 
New Labour used international RCT evidence from the US’ Head Start to establish its Sure 
Start policy, but then encouraged local policymakers to experiment and redesign these 
approaches. The result was the inability to oblige ‘fidelity’ to a specific intervention. For 
proponents of Model 1, it removed any inability to evaluate UK government policy success 
because they no longer knew what its policy was (Rutter, 2006). The hierarchy of evidence 
informed initial problem definition but not policy delivery. More recently, the Conservative-
led government’s ‘Troubled Families’ programme became the ultimate example of the 
projection of centralised government to provide political cover for decentralised policymaking, 
combined with a rather inconsistent and often-cynical use of research evidence (Cairney, 
2019b). Overall, we can see that contradictory pressures, to make governance and evidence 
choices, contribute to a confusing mixture of strategies, in the context of a process that can 
never be ‘evidence based’ in the ways described by its strongest proponents. 
Conclusion 
This story of decentred policymaking warns against simplistic models invoking central 
government control over a linear policy process. There is no policy cycle used by a core group 
of comprehensively rational policymakers and analysts at the heart of government. Instead, 
there are many policymakers, spread across many levels and types of government, and pursuing 
their own ideas about how to combine good evidence and good policymaking. Policymakers 
act without knowledge of most information available to them, and they do so by employing 
cognitive and organisational shortcuts. No one is in control of this process: ministers inherit 
choices from their predecessors, delegate new choices to civil servants and pressure 
participants, delegate policy delivery to a vast landscape of organisations, and have to ignore 
almost all decisions taken in their name. In turn, the organisations and individuals that deliver 
  
policy can only fulfil a small proportion of central government demands, and often develop 
their own standard operating procedures and make policy as they deliver. In such complex 
policymaking systems, outcomes often seem to ‘emerge’ despite many central government 
attempts to control them. 
Central government policymakers deal with such constraints in contradictory ways. They often 
delegate choices and foster new forms of accountability to reflect the limits to central control. 
They also try to hoard power or reassert central control, partly to respond to an electoral 
imperative associated with Westminster-style democratic accountability. The overall result is 
messy, with ministers letting go and intervening in policy in an ad hoc fashion. It is not 
described well by accounts that focus only on aspect of this dynamic (attempts to centralize 
some aspects of policymaking), and ignore the logical consequence (the need to ignore all other 
aspect of policymaking). 
Although the UK and Scottish governments have reputations for more or less centralist 
approaches, both face similar dilemmas and address them in similar ways. Their choices reflect 
their need to appear to be in control while dealing with the fact that they are not. The UK 
Government often accentuates its top-down approach while actually encouraging a range of 
governance practices. The Scottish Government experience suggests that ministers face the 
same need to hold on and let go, even if they declare support for a bottom-up style of 
governance that contrasts with the caricature of the UK government’s top-down style.   
These conclusions help us understand the ways in which UK and Scottish Governments try to 
encourage EBPM and make trade-offs between centralism and letting go. Both governments 
entertain three competing models of EBPM, as well as many variants combining these models 
in often-contradictory ways. The end-result is a ‘let a million flowers bloom’ mantra, which 
implies that governments choose to entertain methodological pluralism rather than engaging 
unwittingly in, or being powerless to halt, contradictory practices.  
Overall, the idea of a powerful central state is perhaps attractive but its pursuit is 
counterproductive, since it prompts us to build hope for EBPM on false assumptions and 
simplistic solutions. The idea of the decentred state is less attractive but more useful. It prompts 
us to think, about the practices we seek to understand and influence, rather than assume that 
they are bad because they do not live up to an artificial ideal.   
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